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Abstract—With the growing realization that current Internet
protocols are reaching the limits of their senescence, a number of
on-going research efforts aim to design potential next-generation
Internet architectures. Although they vary in maturity and scope,
in order to avoid past pitfalls, these efforts seek to treat security
and privacy as fundamental requirements. Resilience to Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attacks that plague today’s Internet is a major
issue for any new architecture and deserves full attention.
In this paper, we focus on DoS in a specific candidate next-
generation Internet architecture called Named-Data Networking
(NDN) – an instantiation of Information-Centric Networking
approach. By stressing content dissemination, NDN appears to
be attractive and viable approach to many types of current and
emerging communication models. It also incorporates some basic
security features that mitigate certain attacks. However, NDN’s
resilience to DoS attacks has not been analyzed to-date. This
paper represents the first step towards assessment and possible
mitigation of DoS in NDN. After identifying and analyzing several
new types of attacks, it investigates their variations, effects
and counter-measures. This paper also sheds some light on the
long-standing debate about relative virtues of self-certifying, as
opposed to human-readable, names.
Keywords: Future Internet Architectures; Content-Centric
Networks; Information-Centric Networks, Named-data Net-
working; Security; Denial-of-Service; Distributed Denial-of-
Service.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet clearly represents an overwhelming and unique
global success story. Billions of people worldwide use it to
perform a wide range of everyday tasks. It hosts a large
number of information-intensive services and interconnects
many millions of wired, wireless, fixed and mobile computing
devices. The Internet also serves as a means of disseminating
enormous (and ever-increasing) amounts of digital content.
Since its inception, the amount of data exchanged over the In-
ternet has witnessed exponential growth. Recently, this growth
intensified due to increases in: (1) distribution of multimedia
content, (2) popularity of social networks and (3) amount of
user-generated content. Unfortunately, the same usage model
that fostered Internet’s success is also exposing its limitations.
Core ideas of today’s Internet were developed in the 1970-s,
when telephony – exemplified by a point-to-point conversation
between two entities – was the only successful example of
effective global communication technology. Moreover, original
Internet applications were few and modest in terms of band-
width and throughput requirements, e.g., store-and-forward
email and remote computer access.
The way people access and utilize the Internet has changed
dramatically since the 1970-s and today the Internet has to
continuously accommodate new services and applications as
well as different usage models. To keep pace with changes
and move the Internet into the future, a number of research
efforts to design new Internet architectures have been initiated
in recent years.
Named-Data Networking (NDN) [29] is one such effort.
NDN is an on-going research project that aims to develop a
candidate next-generation Internet architecture. It instantiates
the so-called Content-Centric (CCN) or Information-Centric
(ICN) approach [19], [22], [24] to networking. NDN explicitly
names content instead of physical locations (i.e., hosts or
network interfaces) and thus transforms content into a first-
class entity. NDN also stipulates that each piece of named
content must be digitally signed by its producer. This allows
decoupling of trust in content from trust in the entity that might
store and/or disseminate that content. These NDN features
facilitate automatic caching of content to optimize bandwidth
use and enable effective simultaneous utilization of multiple
network interfaces.
NDN has been demonstrated as a viable and attractive
architecture for content distribution [22] as well as real-time
[21] and anonymous communication [12]. A number of other
NDN-related research efforts are also underway.
A. DoS and DDoS
In recent years, denial of service (DoS) and distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks have become more and more
common and notorious. In the latter, the adversary exploits a
large number of compromised hosts (zombies), that surgically
aim their attacks at specific target(s). Although DDoS attacks
are generally easy to instantiate and require little technical
sophistication on the part of the adversary, they are often very
effective and difficult to mitigate. (NOTE: hereafter, we use
the term DoS to include both single-source and multi-source
– i.e., DDoS – denial-of-service attacks.)
We believe that any new Internet architecture should: (1)
be resilient to existing DoS attacks, or at least limit their
effectiveness, (2) anticipate new attacks that take advantage
of its idiosyncrasies, and (3) incorporate basic defenses in its
design.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no scientific
and systematic assessment of how NDN fares with respect to
DoS attacks. We believe that such assessment is both timely
and very important. While NDN appears to be quite efficient
in terms of content distribution between well-behaved (honest)
entities, it is unclear how it would cope with malicious parties.
This paper tries to address these issues by analyzing the impact
of current DoS attacks on NDN, identifying new attacks that
rely on NDN features, and proposing some countermeasures.
We emphasize that this paper should be seen not as a compre-
hensive treatment of security (or even DoS) in NDN. Instead,
it represents a first step towards identifying DoS attacks as
well as their impact and securing NDN against them.
B. Anticipated Contributions
The main goal of this paper is to explore, and evaluate
effects of DoS attacks against NDN. We believe that only
by better understanding the effects and repercussions of these
attacks we can begin to develop sensible and effective coun-
termeasures. Anticipated contributions are as follows:
• We show that DoS attacks effective in the current IP-
based Internet are largely ineffective against NDN. This
is not really surprising since current attacks are very much
tailored to TCP/IP, current routing protocols, HTTP, DNS,
etc.
• We identify and describe two new and major types
of NDN-specific DoS attacks, based on: (1) interest
flooding, and (2) content/cache poisoning. We argue that
both types of attack require long-term exploration.
• We then analyze the impact of several flavors of both
attack types and propose a set of potential counter-
measures.
Organization: The rest of the paper is structured as follows:
Section II provides an overview of NDN. We discuss how
NDN copes with existing DoS/DDoS attacks in Section III,
and examine new – NDN-specific – ones in Sections IV and
V. Section VI overviews related work. Finally, we conclude
in Section VII
II. NDN OVERVIEW
As mentioned in Section I, NDN [29], [22] is a network
architecture based on named content. Rather than addressing
content by its location, NDN refers to it by name. A content
name is composed of one or more variable-length components
that are opaque to the network. Component boundaries are
explicitly delimited by “/” in the usual representation. For
example, the name of a CNN news content for May 20,
2012 might look like: /ndn/cnn/news/2012may20. Large
pieces of content can be split into fragments with pre-
dictable names: fragment 137 of Alice’s YouTube video could
be named: /ndn/youtube/alice/video-749.avi/137.
Since NDN’s main abstraction is content, there is no explicit
notion of “hosts”, albeit, their existence is assumed.
Communication adheres to the pull model: content is de-
livered to consumers only upon explicit request. A consumer
requests content by sending an interest packet. If an entity (a
router or a host) can “satisfy” a given interest, it returns the
corresponding data packet. Interest and content are the only
types of packets in NDN. A content packet with name X is
never forwarded or routed unless it is preceded by an interest
for name X. (Strictly speaking, content named X′ 6= X can be
delivered in response to an interest for X, but only if X is a
prefix of X′.)
NDN routers must include of the following components:
• Content Store (CS), used for content caching and re-
trieval;
• Forwarding Interest Base (FIB), that contains a table of
name prefixes and corresponding outgoing interfaces (to
route interests);
• Pending Interest Table (PIT) – a table containing a set
of currently unsatisfied interests and their corresponding
incoming interfaces;
When a router receives an interest for name X and there
are no pending interests for the same name in its PIT, it
forwards the interest to the next hop, according to its FIB.
For each forwarded interest, a router stores some amount of
state information, including the name in the interest and the
interface on which it arrived. However, if an interest for X
arrives while there is already an entry for the same name
in the PIT, the router collapses the present interest (and any
subsequent ones for X) storing only the interface on which it
was received. When content is returned, the router forwards it
out on all interfaces from which an interest for X has arrived
and flushes the corresponding PIT entry. Since no additional
information is needed to deliver content, an interest does not
carry a “source address”.
Any NDN router can provide content caching through its
CS. The size of CS is limited only by resource availability.
Consequently, content might be fetched from any number of
network caches, rather than from its original producer. Hence,
NDN has no notion of “destination addresses”.
NDN deals with content authenticity and integrity by mak-
ing digital signatures mandatory for all content. A signature
binds content with its name, and provides origin authentication
no matter how, when or from where it is retrieved. Public keys
are treated as regular content: since all content is signed, each
public key content is effectively a simple “certificate”. NDN
does not mandate any particular certification infrastructure,
relegating trust management to individual applications.
Content objects are named data packets.1 Fields of a data
packet include [7]:
• Signature: public key signature (e.g., RSA or DSA)
computed over the entire data packet, including its name.
• Keylocator: references the key needed to verify the
content signature. This field can contain one of the
following: (1) verification (public) key; (2) certificate
containing verification key; or (3) NDN name referencing
verification key.
• PublisherPublicKeyDigest: hash of the data
packet producer’s public key.
In addition to the name of requested content, an interest packet
carries several fields [8]. In this paper, we are interested in the
following (others are omitted for clarity):
• PublisherPublicKeyDigest: this optional field
contains the hash of the producer’s public key for the
requested piece of data.
• Exclude: an optional field that embodies a description
of name components that should not appear in the data
packet in response to the interest.
1In the rest of the paper, we use the terms content object and data packet
interchangeably.
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• AnswerOriginKind: encodes determines whether the
answer to an interest can retrieved from a CS or must be
generated by the producer.
• Scope: limits where the Interest may propagate; Scope
0 and 1 limit propagation to the originating host; Scope
2 limits propagation to no further than the next host.
III. NDN AND CURRENT DOS ATTACKS
We now consider how NDN fares against DoS attacks. We
initially focus on current DoS types often encountered on the
Internet. Next, we analyze the impact of these attacks on NDN
and discuss our findings. Then, in the next two sections, we
identify some new DoS attacks that take advantage of NDN
features, and discuss tentative countermeasures.
There is a wide variety of DoS attacks targeting different
network and host resources, protocol layers as well as specific
software. A typical attack is composed of three elements: (1)
a set of zombies under control of a master node or nodes, (2)
master node(s) controlling the zombies, and (3) a set of victim
hosts and/or routers.
A common way to obtain zombies to remotely exploit
software vulnerabilities and inject malware into a set of
unpatched hosts. NDN makes this somewhat harder – yet far
from impossible – because hosts are not directly addressable.
However, there is no indication that software vulnerabilities
will disappear or even decrease significantly over time. Thus,
we assume that adversaries will continue to have access to
large numbers of zombies by means such as exploitation of
un-patched vulnerabilities or phishing.
A. Impact of Current Attacks on NDN
We now examine some popular types of DoS attacks that
work against current TCP/IP-based Internet and assess their
putative effects on NDN.
Reflection Attacks. A reflection attack involves three parties:
the adversary, a victim host, and a set of secondary victims
(reflectors). The goal of the adversary is to use the reflectors to
overwhelm the victim host with traffic. To do so, a reflection
attack uses IP packets with forged addresses: the adversary
replaces its own source address with the address of its intended
victim, and sends these packets to the secondary victims.
Responses to such packets are not routed back to the adversary,
and overwhelm the victim instead. To be effective, such
attacks require some form of amplification, i.e., the amount
of data used by the adversary to perform the attack must be
significantly smaller than the amount of data received by the
victim.
NDN is generally resilient to this type of attack due to the
symmetric nature of the path taken by each interest and the
corresponding content. A content packet must follow, in re-
verse, the path established by the preceding interest. However,
note that an NDN router is allowed to broadcast an incoming
interest on some or all of its interfaces. (In other words, an
interest broadcast can occur at any hop). Nonetheless, even if
each hop (including the consumer) broadcasts the interest, the
maximum number of content copies a consumer can receive
is bounded by the number of its interfaces, and not by the
number of entities that receive an interest. Consequently, the
only effective reflection-style attack requires the adversary to
be on the same physical network (e.g., Ethernet or WLAN)
as the intended victim. Then, the adversary broadcasts one or
more interests on all available interfaces (with the victim’s
layer-2 address as the source) and the victim subsequently
receives multiple copies of requested content. This attack
seems somewhat effective since the adversary’s amplification
factor is based on the comparatively small size of interests with
respect to that of content. However, NDN routers incorporate
a useful suppression feature:
Whenever an NDN router “overhears” a content
packet on a broadcast interface IFx for which it
has a current PIT entry with the incoming interface
IFx, it caches the said content and flushes the PIT
entry. Note that another copy of the same content
might be later delivered via the outgoing interface
(IFy) for that PIT entry; it will be discarded since,
by that time, the corresponding PIT entry will have
been flushed.
This feature ensures that multiple NDN routers on the same
broadcast domain do not serve the same content more than
once, even if the original interest was broadcast.
Bandwidth Depletion. In a typical coordinated distributed
attack, adversary-controlled zombies flood their victims with
IP traffic in order to saturate their network resources. The usual
goal is to make the victims unreachable by others and/or, more
generally, to inhibit victims’ ability to communicate. Normally,
such attacks are carried out via TCP, UDP or ICMP and rely
on sending a stream of packets to the victim at the maximum
data rate.2
A similar kind of attack can be mounted against NDN
by directing a large number of zombies to request existing
content from a certain victim. However, it is easy to see that
the effectiveness of this attack would be very limited. Once
the content is initially pulled from its producer, it is cached
at intervening routers and subsequent interests retrieve it from
these routers’ caches. Therefore, the network itself would limit
the number of interests that reach the victim.
Black-Holing and Prefix Hijacking. In a prefix hijack-
ing [3] attack, a misconfigured, compromised or malicious
autonomous system (AS) advertises invalid routers so as to
motivate other AS-s to forward their traffic to it. This can
result in so-called “black-holing” whereby all traffic sent to
the malicious AS is simply discarded. This attack is effective
in IP networks, since, once routing information is polluted, it is
difficult for routers to detect, and recover from, the problem.
While countermeasures have been proposed (e.g., [26]) this
remains a serious threat to the current Internet.
2TCP-based attacks also exploit connection-based nature of the protocol:
each packet sent by zombies tries to open a new connection, which, in turn,
requires the victim to create and store corresponding state, thus saturating its
resources.
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NDN is resilient to black-holing implemented via prefix hi-
jacking. NDN routers have access to strictly more information
than their IP counterparts and can use such information to
detect anomalies in the content distribution process. Since each
content follows the same path as the interest that requested
it, the number of unsatisfied (expired) interests can be used
to determine whether a particular prefix has been hijacked.
Also, NDN routers maintain statistics about performance of
each link and interface with respect to a particular prefix and
change their forwarding strategy according to such statistics.
Loop detection and elimination allows routers to explore
topological redundancy through multipath forwarding. Multi-
path routing further reduces impact of prefix hijacking, since it
allows routers to try alternative paths as a reaction to attacks.
This increases the probability of forwarding interests through
a path that has not been affected by the attack. In contrast
with IP, advertising fake routes in NDN does not allow the
adversary to mount a loop-holing attack
To sum up, the NDN forwarding plane allows routers to:
(1) quickly (i.e., at RTT scale) detect and react to network
failures; (2) detect and circumvent hijacking attacks and (3)
incorporate congestion into forwarding decisions.
DNS Cache Poisoning. In the current Internet, DNS servers
translates human-readable names to the corresponding IP
address and vice-versa. For performance reasons, DNS servers
usually store the output of previous requests in their cache.
There is a well know attack, called DNS cache poisoning [11],
which allows the adversary to insert corrupted entries in a
DNS server’s cache in order to control the server responses
for a set of DNS names. The best countermeasure against this
attack is the use of the DNS Security Extensions protocol, i.e.,
DNSSEC [13]; however, as of today DNSSEC has not been
widely deployed on the Internet.
Packet names in NDN are routed directly, rather than being
converted to addresses. While this implies that there is no need
for services that perform name resolution (and therefore such
service can not be corrupted), it still is possible to conceive
an attack analogous to DNS poisoning on NDN. We believe
that the closest counterpart of DNS cache poisoning in NDN
is a combination of route hijacking and content poisoning:
the adversary would force a routing change (if necessary) that
allows it to be on the path for a set of namespaces that are
going to be affected by the attack. Then, it answers interests
with data packets carrying an arbitrary payload.
Intuitively, signatures on data packets allow consumers to
determine whether the content has been poisoned. Sections
V and following are devoted to this kind of attack and its
countermeasures.
B. Towards New DoS Attacks
Despite their seeming lack of effectiveness or greatly re-
duced impact, variations of aforementioned current DoS at-
tacks might be quite effective against NDN.
Recall that two key features distinguish current Internet
routers from their NDN counterparts: (1) pending interest state
(PIT entries) needed to perform content routing and (2) the
use of content caches. In subsequent sections, we describe
two classes of attacks – Interest Flooding and Content/Cache
Poisoning – that capitalize on these NDN features. In addition,
we anticipate other types of DoS-related NDN attacks, such as
those that focus on routing. However, we believe that attacks
targeting these two specific key features of NDN represent
most serious and immediate threats, thus warranting an in-
depth investigation.
IV. INTEREST FLOODING
Routing of content is performed using state in PIT-s es-
tablished by interests, i.e., the name of each incoming content
packet is used to look up the PIT and identify a corresponding
entry. The adversary can take advantage of this state to mount
an effective DoS attack, which we term “interest flooding”.
In such an attack, the adversary (controlling a set of possibly
geographically distributed zombies) generates a large number
of closely-spaced interests, aiming to (a) overwhelm (PIT-s)
in routers, in order to prevent them from handling legitimate
interests, and/or (b) swamp the targeted content producer(s).
Since NDN interests lack source address and are not secured
(e.g., not signed) by design, it is difficult to determine the
attack originator(s) and take targeted countermeasures.
We identify three types of interest flooding attacks, based
on the type of content requested: (1) existing or static, (2)
dynamically-generated, and (3) non-existent (i.e., unsatisfi-
able interests). In all cases, the adversary uses zombies to
generate a large number of interests requesting content from
targeted producers. While attacks (1) and (3) are mostly aimed
at the network infrastructure, (2) affects both network and
application-layer functionalities.
Similarly to bandwidth depletion attacks discussed in the
previous section, the impact of type (1) attacks is quite
limited since in-network content caching provides a built-in
countermeasure. Suppose that there are several zombies, each
with independent path to the targeted producer. After the initial
“wave” of interests from these zombies, content settles in all
intervening routers’ caches. Subsequent interests for the same
content do not propagate to the producer(s) since they are
satisfied via cached copies.
In case of type (2) attacks, benefits of in-network content
caching are lost. Since requested content is dynamic, all
interests are routed to content producer(s), thus consuming
bandwidth and router PIT state. Also, if generating dynamic
content is expensive – signing content is a good example
relatively expensive per-packet operation – content producers
might waste significant computational resources. (One con-
crete example of this attack class could target a web server
that allows site-wide searches: each zombie issues an interest
that requests the victim server to search its entire site for a
random string.) The direct outcome of this attack type is that
the producer wastes resources to satisfy malicious, rather than
legitimate, interests. The impact on routers varies with their
distance from the targeted content producer: the closer a router
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is to the producer, the greater the effect on its PIT due to more
concentrated attack traffic.
Type (3) attacks involve zombies issuing unsatisfiable in-
terests for non-existent content. Such interests can not be
collapsed by routers, and are routed to the targeted content
producers. The latter can quickly ignore such interests without
incurring significant overhead. However, such interests will
linger and take up space in router PIT-s until they eventually
expire. We consider routers to be primary intended victims of
this attack type. Given an existing prefix /ndn/prefix, there
are several easy ways to construct unsatisfiable interests:
1) Set the name in the interest to: /ndn/prefix/nonce,
where the suffix nonce is a random value. Since NDN
performs longest-prefix matching, interests will be for-
warded all the way to the producer and never satisfied.
2) Set the PublisherPublicKeyDigest field to a ran-
dom value. Since no public key would match this value,
the interest will remain unsatisfied.
3) Set the interest Exclude filter to exclude all existing
content starting with /ndn/prefix, e.g., by using a
Bloom Filter with almost all bits set to 1. Such an interest
can not be satisfied since it simultaneously requests and
excludes the same content.
In fact, there is another way of mounting type (3) attacks that
does not even require the adversary to recruit any zombies.
Recall that each data packet has a KeyLocator field (see
Section II). This field can contain the NDN name of the data
packet’s verification key. This feature can be abused to mount
a type (3) attack as follows:
The adversary publishes a large amount of content
(e.g., a video), that is split into numerous con-
tent packets. Each packet references a distinct non-
existent verification key, such that an interest for this
key is not satisfiable.
To increase the effectiveness of this attack, all spurious key
names must be routed towards the same producer. This way, a
large number of unsuspecting consumers are “forced” to issue
interests that overwhelm one or more victim’s PIT-s. We point
out that NDN automatically mitigates such attacks through
interest collapsing. Since the pool of fake key-names is limited
by the number of packets comprising malicious content, rather
than by the combined bandwidth of the zombies, interests with
the same name will be collapsed by routers. Therefore, the
total number of fake key-names represents an upper bound
on the amount of space that can be consumed in the victims’
PIT-s.
A. Tentative Countermeasures
We consider several potential countermeasures. The ease of
interest flooding attacks is partly due to lack of authentication
of interests. Anyone can generate a stream of interests and
a given NDN router only knows that a particular interest
entered on a specific interface. There is no other information
about its source. One trivial solution might be to require
signatures on interests. However, this would immediately raise
serious privacy concerns, as discussed in [12] and would also
introduce new DoS vulnerabilities due to the computational
overhead of signature verification.
On the other hand, we believe that potential problems and
DoS attacks due to interest flooding can be addressed without
requiring source authentication. This is because NDN routers
are stateful and can learn much more information about carried
traffic than their current IP counterparts.
Router Statistics. NDN routers can easily keep track of
unsatisfied (expired) interests and use this information to limit
the following:
• # of pending interests per outgoing interface: NDN cre-
ates flow balance between interests and content. For each
interest sent upstream, at most one data packet satisfying
that interest can flow downstream. Based on that property,
it is trivial for each router to calculate the maximum
number of pending interest per outgoing interface that
the downstream connection can satisfy before they time
out. Thus, a router should calculate and never send more
interests than an interface can satisfy based on average
content package size, timeout for interests and bandwidth-
delay product for the corresponding link.
• # of interests per incoming interface: From the same
flow balance principle, a router can easily detect when
a downstream router is sending too many interests that
can not be all satisfied due to the physical limitations of
the downstream link.
• # of pending interests per namespace: When a certain
prefix is under a DoS attack, routers on the way (espe-
cially those closer to the data producer) can easily detect
unusual number of unsatisfied interests in their PIT-s for
that prefix. In that case, routers can limit the total number
of pending interests for that prefix and throttle down the
number of pending interests for incoming interfaces that
have sent too many unsatisfied interests for that prefix.
Although these countermeasures seem intuitive and possibly
effective, we believe that implementing and testing them will
be quite difficult. Most of all, combining the above three
limiting strategies into one algorithm and choosing appropriate
parameters for maximum effectiveness against attacks and
minimum impairment of legitimate traffic is a challenge. We
leave the design and testing of the actual algorithms to future
work.
Push-back Mechanisms. We also consider one router-based
countermeasure to interest flooding – a push-back mechanism
that allows routers to isolate attack source(s). When a router
suspects an on-going attack for a particular namespace (e.g.,
when it reaches its PIT quota for that namespace on a given
interface), it throttles any new interests for that namespace
and reports this to routers connected on that interface. These
routers, in turn, can propagate such information upstream
towards offending interfaces, while also limiting the rate of
forwarded interests for the namespace under attack. The goal
is to push an attack back all the way to its source(s), or at least
to the location where it is detectable. This countermeasure can
be implemented without any modifications to the current NDN
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infrastructure.
V. CONTENT/CACHE POISONING
We now shift focus to DoS attacks that target content. In this
context, the adversary’s goal is to cause routers to forward and
cache corrupted or fake data packets, consequently preventing
consumers from retrieving legitimate content. We say that a
data packet is corrupted if its signature is invalid. Whereas,
a data packet is fake if it has a valid signature, however,
generated with a wrong (private) key.
As mentioned in Section II, all data packets in NDN are
signed. This provides the following security guarantees:
• Integrity – a valid signature guarantees that the signed
data packet is intact;
• Origin Authentication – since a signature is uniquely
bound to the public key of the signer, anyone can verify
whether content originates with the claimed producer;
• Correctness – a signature binds data packet name with its
payload, thus allowing a consumer to securely determine
whether a data packet is a “correct answer” for the interest
that requested it.
Consumers are expected to perform signature verification on
every data packet before accepting it. Also, any NDN router
can elect to perform signature verification for any content
it forwards and caches. Upon receiving and identifying a
corrupted or fake data packet, a consumer can re-request a
different (possibly valid) copy of the same data packet using
the Exclude field in NDN interest packet.
In theory, content signatures provide an effective and simple
means for detecting content poisoning attacks, since “bad”
content can be easily identified via signature verification. In
other words, NDN should be immune to content poisoning
attacks. However, in practice, this assertion might not hold.
While a consumer can afford to verify all content signatures,
NDN routers face two challenges: (1) signature verification
overhead; and (2) trust management, i.e., what key should
be used to verify a given data packet?
While routers can choose to verify signatures on each data
packet they forward and/or store, for performance reasons,
they are not required to do so. Our tests show that an
optimized software implementation of RSA-1024 signature
verification running on Intel Core 2 Duo 2.53 GHz CPU
allows us to verify about 150 Mbps of traffic, assuming 1, 500-
byte content packets. (Smaller packets would impose even
higher verification overhead). Note that we use the smallest
possible RSA public exponent – 3 – thereby incurring only
two modular multiplications per signature verification. Routers
with multiple Gigabit-speed (or faster) interfaces would need
an unrealistic amount of computing power to verify packets at
wire rate.
Content signatures also trigger the issue of global trust
management architecture. Without it, routers can not determine
the public key needed to verify the data packet signature. This
creates a tension between flexibility (since an application can
adopt an arbitrary trust model for its content) and security
(any NDN router must be able to, if its chooses, verify any
data packet’s signature). Even though each NDN data packet
contains a reference to its signature verification (public) key,
such references can not be trusted as they can be easily abused
by the adversary.
A. Attack Variants
The impracticality of NDN routers verifying all signatures
on forwarded or cached data packets opens the door for content
poisoning attacks. As mentioned before, one can not push
poisoned content unilaterally, i.e., without any prior interest
requesting that content. Consequently, we identify two attacks
variants:
1) Suppose that the adversary is aware of current (pending)
interests for particular content, e.g., because it controls
some NDN routers. Compromised routers that receive
interests for that content simply inject (satisfy interests
with) poisoned content, which may then be cached by
other intervening routers.
2) Suppose that the adversary anticipates interests in partic-
ular content, e.g., a major news-story is about to break
on CNN or a patch for a popular operating system
is about to being released. We also assume that the
name of the corresponding content is predictable. The
adversary, via numerous distributed zombies, issues many
near-simultaneous “legitimate” interests for that content.
Next, a compromised host or router (that receives one
or more such interests) replies with poisoned content.
Then, caches of routers (that processed preceding inter-
ests) become populated with copies of poisoned content.
Subsequent interests for the same content will return a
cached version of the same poisoned content.
In [38] Xie et al. consider a different technique for introducing
poisoned content in caches. An adversary, who controls a set
of zombies, forces them to request content produced by the
adversary. Such content will take space in caches that could
otherwise be used more effectively to store “real” popular
content, i.e., this is a locality-disruption attack. In this work,
we do not consider such attacks, for two reasons: (1) content
injected by the adversary is never delivered to consumers
who do not explicitly request it; and (2) this attack can be
considered as legitimate use of NDN; caching policies should
be designed to deal with this consumer behavior.
While the two aforementioned poisoned content attack
variants require different adversarial capabilities, their impact
on the network is almost identical. For this reason, we design
countermeasures that address the effect of both.
B. Tentative Countermeasures
We now discuss tentative countermeasures to content poi-
soning attacks. First we focus on the construction of a strong
binding between interests and corresponding data packets.
We introduce two constructions, based on standard NDN
features, and analyze their benefits and drawbacks. Then, we
propose further countermeasures based on heuristics, inter-
router communication and user feedback.
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1) Self-Certifying and Human-Readable Naming: Self-
certifying naming [15] (SCN) allows parties to verify the
association between a name and the corresponding object
without relying on auxiliary information, such as Public Key
Certificates and a PKI. This makes SCN an effective counter-
measure against content poisoning attacks [17].
There are a few well-known approaches in the literature for
implementing SCN. The two most popular ones are geared
for static [16] and dynamic content [15], respectively. In the
former, an object name is computed as the hash of its content.
In the latter, an object name is constructed as: H(pk) :L where
H(pk) is the hash of the producer’s public key pk and L is a
human-readable label.
Users are not expected to handle self-certifying names
directly. Instead, SCN requires a secure indirection mechanism
to map from names familiar to users to the corresponding self-
certifying names.
NDN uses hierarchical Human-Readable Naming (HRN)
for content. Human-readable names are designed to be user-
friendly, i.e., allow consumers to anticipate, guess and remem-
ber the name of content they wish to retrieve. As discussed
in [33], HRN’s advantages over SCN can be summarized as:
1) More efficient routing: SCN provides a flat, location-free
namespace, which makes it difficult to efficiently retrieve
a nearby (cached) copy of content corresponding to a
particular name [5]. Whereas, SCN-based architectures
resolve names using a location- independent mechanism,
such as DHTs [34], [39];
2) Better usability: consumers can easily understand the
relationship between an object and its human-readable
name;
3) Less complex infrastructure: HRN does not require the
use of a trusted name resolution mechanism to map
human-readable to network-intelligible names.
Unfortunately, human readability precludes a strong (i.e.,
cryptographic) binding between a name and a corresponding
object. In order to determine whether a human-readable name
is appropriate for an object, additional mechanisms (e.g., a
PKI) must be in place.
We consider whether it is possible to integrate the func-
tionalities of SCN into NDN, without changing its naming
structure. To this end, we introduce “Self-Certifying Inter-
ests/Data packets” (SCID), a mechanism that allows routers to
efficiently and securely determine whether a piece of content
is the “correct answer” for particular interest. Two variants of
SCID: one for static (S-SCID) and one for dynamic (D-SCID)
content, are described below.
2) Static Content: One of the components automatically
appended to the name of each NDN data packet upon its
creation is a cryptographic hash computed over its data,
name (up to the hash itself) and the signature. A consumer
requesting a data packet by name, can elect to use this last
hash component in an NDN interest. (Assuming, of course,
that the consumer somehow knows this hash ahead of time.)
NDN routers can easily and efficiently determine whether
a returned data packet corresponds to its requested name
with very low overhead. In fact, routers in the current NDN
prototype always verify content hashes. Our results show that a
software implementation of SHA-256 can achieve throughput
of 1.5Gbps of traffic (assuming 1, 500-byte packets) on the
Intel Core 2 Duo platform, as in Section V. This is stark
contrast with the measly 150Mbps throughput we observed
in verifying RSA-1024 signatures.
This technique, which we refer to as S-SCID, prevents
the adversary from serving corrupted or fake data packets in
response to an interest: the hash of the wrong content can not
match the one expressed by the consumer.
Linking multiple data packets is quite simple. For example,
let CO1, . . . , COm be the collection of data packets corre-
sponding to a large file. COi includes (in its payload) the hash
of COi+1. If the hash of CO1 can be obtained beforehand, all
COi-s can be retrieved securely with no danger of fetching
the wrong or poisoned content. The problem is thus reduced
to discovering the hash of the initial fragment CO1.
Also, when fetching a large file, a consumer might wish
to have several simultaneously outstanding interests, in order
to maximize bandwidth usage. Therefore, it is insufficient for
data packets to be singly-linked, as described above. Instead,
COi needs to reference COi+1, ...COi+u where u is the
highest number of concurrently pending interests. We expect
that u is set by the content producer based on the nature
of specific content. Determining appropriate values for u is
outside the scope of this paper.
While simple and efficient, S-SCID has several limitations.
Clearly, a consumer can not be expected to anticipate, guess,
remember or recognize the hash of content it is about to re-
quest. This translates into a classical chicken-and-egg problem.
The usual SCN solution is to rely on a trusted infrastructure
for mapping human-readable to self-certifying names, akin to
what DNS does today. We discuss how to address this issue
(without requiring such infrastructures) in the next section.
S-SCID also imposes restrictions on inter-packet dependen-
cies. In order for packet A to link to packet B (A → B),
the latter must be created and named first. This issue makes
it impossible for packets to be linked in a cycle, e.g., A →
B → C → A. Consequently, it is unclear how to support
current Web applications that often involve loops in content
linkage. Also, this technique is unsuitable for dynamic content.
In other words, a consumer has no means of foretelling the
hash of an packet that does not exist at the time of request,
e.g., the desired packet is the result of a Web search.
3) Dynamic Content: Settings that involve cyclically linked
and/or dynamic content require a different flavor of SCID.
NDN interests include the PublisherPublicKeyDigest
field, as discussed in Section II. This field contains the (SHA-
256) hash of the public key of the producer of the matching
data packet. Thus, a consumer can (optionally) specify the
public key that it associates with a desired content name. If
this field is present in an interest, each intervening NDN router
must make sure that the corresponding data packet references
the same public key. We call this technique D-SCID.
Unlike C-SCID, data packets that use D-SCID can include
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arbitrary references to other data packets, including cyclic
links or links to dynamically generated content. Also, once
a consumer learns the hash of a producer’s public key, it can
use it to request all content from that producer. Therefore,
the nature of links between data packets does not limit the
number of concurrent pending interests that consumers can
issue to retrieve a piece of content.
D-SCID prevents adversaries from injecting fake content in
response to an interest. However, corrupted content can still
be returned as long as it references the appropriate producer’s
public key. (This is, again, because NDN routers are not
mandated to verify content signatures.) While S-SCID requires
producers to explicitly specify inter-packet links, D-SCID does
not have such requirement.
Both flavors of SCID combine the benefits of self-certifying
and human-readable names. SCID does not mandate any
particular trust model. Also, S-SCID and D-SCID are not
mutually exclusive.
Let CO1, . . . , COm be a collection of data packets cor-
responding to a large file, created according to S-SCID –
i.e., each COi contains a reference to the hash of COi+1. A
consumer first retrieves the content producer’s public key pk
via its preferred public key distribution mechanism. The hash
of pk is used to set the PublisherPublicKeyDigest
field of the interest for CO1. Once CO1 is retrieved, the
consumer extracts the hash of CO2 from CO1 and issues
an interests for CO2 using this hash as last component.
Subsequent interests are issued similarly.
SCN-based architectures generally assume the existence of
a trusted infrastructure that performs mapping between real-
world entities and corresponding self-certifying names. Under
the same assumption, SCID is a very effective countermeasure
against content poisoning attacks; in particular, in the case
of static content the exposure of the network to such attacks
is drastically reduced since SCID prevents distribution of
fake content. As far as corrupted content, only the first in
a collection of packets can be corrupted.
Trust in the first packet of a collection can be bootstrapped
using a traditional PKI, as shown in the previous exam-
ple, or with other mechanisms such as web of trust [2],
SPKI/SDSI [14], [1], etc.
We believe that a combination of the two SCID flavors
offers a flexible, trust-model independent solution for securing
NDN against content poisoning. To the best of our knowledge,
no current SCN-based system allows naming content using
both “static” and “dynamic” self-certifying names.
C. Traffic Sampling for Signature Verification
We now discuss some probabilistic and collaborative tech-
niques for verifying content signatures by NDN routers.
Probabilistic Independent Verification. Routers verify a
random subset of cached content. Corrupted packets are imme-
diately removed, while those with valid signatures are marked
as such and never verified again.
Let r1, . . . , rn be a collection of routers. Let pkt be a
data packet stored in all these routers’ caches and 1/vi – the
fraction of packets in ri’s cache that are verified at any given
time. pkt is checked by at least one router with probability
P = 1−
∏n
i=1(1 − 1/vi).
Probabilistic Disjoint Verification. A more effective strategy
involves evenly distributing the verification load among a set
of routers belonging to the same organization. Let r1, . . . , rn
be routers in the same organization, and let hCO be the least
significant 32 bits of the hash of data packet CO. Router
ri verifies CO if hCO ≡ i mod n. Assuming that hCO is
distributed uniformly between 0 and 232 − 1, all routers need
to verify roughly the same number of packets.
Unfortunately, the adversary can significantly reduce the
effectiveness of this strategy by generating data packets that
are only verified by one router. Specifically, the adversary
picks an arbitrary value x ∈ [1, n], creates random data packets
and injects them into the network only if h mod n = x.
To prevent this attack, we replace the hash function used
to generate h with a keyed hash function (HMAC [4]), as
follows. All routers belonging to the same organization share
a secret key k. Let hkCO be the 32 least significant bits of
HMACk(H(CO)). Router ri verifies CO if hkCO mod n = i.
Since HMACk(·) is a pseudorandom function, the adversary
can mount the attack only if it knows the secret key k.
Let 1/vi (with vi < n for all i ∈ [1, n]) be the fraction of
cached data packets that a router can verify. Given a packet
pkt, stored in all caches of routers in the same organization,
pkt is verified with probability P = 1−
∏n
i=1(1− n/vi).
Neighbor Verification Feedback. To maximize utility of
individual router’s signature verification, we consider a cooper-
ative approach whereby nodes actively exchange information
about validity of individual data packets. By having a large
number of routers verifying packets and cooperating, cryp-
tographic operations can be applied less frequently without
lowering network’s resistance to content poisoning attacks.
Basically, each router (as above) verifies its cached packets
probabilistically and independently. However, if it determines
that a given data packet is corrupted, a router issues a special
warning interest on all its interfaces. A warning references
/ndn/warning/hCO, where /ndn/warning/ corresponds to
a special reserved namespace and hCO represents the hash
of the corrupted data packet. The scope field of a warning
interest is set to 2, i.e., this interest type is not forwarded past
one hop.
When a router receives a warning interest, it checks whether
its cache contains a referenced packet with hash hCO. If
not, the router discards the warning. Otherwise it verifies the
content it with some probability p that might depend, on its
current router CPU load. If signature verification fails, the
router issues its own warning to its neighbors. Otherwise,
further warnings from the same interface are ignored for a
pre-defined period. To prevent the adversary from injecting
fraudulent warnings, every pair of adjacent routers could share
a symmetric key and use it to authenticate warnings, e.g., using
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Consumer Feedback. Recall that consumers verify all sig-
natures on data packets. We take advantage of this property
to design a feedback-based verification strategy for routers.
Consumer feedback can be implemented similarly to Neighbor
Verification Feedback discussed above, i.e., through specially
scoped interests. However, allowing consumers to provide
feedback prompts several new challenges: (1) there is no
pairwise trust relationship between a router and consumers,
even if they are one hop away; (2) consumers are more likely
to be compromised than routers; (3) consumers have almost
no accountability: it might not be possible to determine which
consumer issued a false warning.
The intuition behind our strategy is that consumer feedback
should not trigger immediate action by a router. However,
a router should monitor collective (aggregated) consumer
feedback and act whenever its volume exceeds some threshold.
Our strategy is based on a probabilistic trust value
T ∈ [0, 1], associated with each content in a router’s cache.
T = 1 indicates that the corresponding content packet has been
verified, while T ≈ 0 indicates that it should be selected for
verification with probability proportional to 1− T , or deleted
if the cache becomes full. New data packets are assigned
T = 0.5. This value increases every time the data packet is
retrieved, and decreases whenever the router receives negative
feedback from a consumer.
VI. RELATED WORK
NDN is an instantiation of the Content-Centric Network-
ing (CCN) paradigm. (An alternative term “Information-
Centric Networking” is largely synonymous.) Other related
architectures include the Data-Oriented Network Architecture
(DONA) [25] and TRIAD. DONA is based on “flat” self-
certifying names, computed as the cryptographic hash of
the producer’s public key and a (possibly) human-readable
label. Such label, however, is not cryptographically bound
to the content. New content is published – i.e., registered –
with a tree of trusted resolution handlers to enable retrieval.
Resolution handlers maintain a forwarding table that provides
next-hop information for pieces of content in the network. As
such, DONA does not support dynamically generated content.
Similar to NDN, TRIAD [10] names content using human-
readable, location-independent names. It maps names to avail-
able replicas of data using an integrated directory. It then
forwards requests until a copy of the data is found. The data lo-
cation is returned to the client, who retrieves it using standard
HTTP/TCP. TRIAD relies on trusted directories to authenticate
content lookups (but not content itself). For additional security,
the authors of [10] recommend to limit the network to mutually
trusting content routers.
NDN caching performance optimization has been recently
investigated with respect to various metrics including energy
impact [21], [32], [27]. To the best of our knowledge, the
work of Xie, et al. [38] is the first to address cache robustness
in NDN. It introduces CacheShield, a mechanism that helps
routers to prevent caching unpopular content and therefore
maximizing the use of cache for popular content.
There is lots of previous work on DoS attacks on the current
Internet infrastructure. Current literature addresses both attacks
and countermeasures on the routing infrastructure [20], packet
flooding [23], reflection attacks [30], DNS cache poison-
ing [31] and SYN flooding attacks [37]. Proposed counter-
measures are based on various strategies and heuristics, in-
cluding: anomaly detection [6], ingress/egress filtering [36],
IP trace back [28], [35], ISP collaborative defenses [9] and
user-collaborative defenses [18].
VII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we perform initial analysis of NDN’s re-
silience to DoS attacks. In doing so, we start by considering
attacks on the current Internet and assess their impact on NDN.
. We then identify two new type of attacks specific to NDN:
interest flooding and cache/content poisoning. For type, we
discuss effects and potential countermeasures.
Clearly, this paper represents only the first step towards
mitigation of DoS in the context of NDN. Much more work
is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of proposed coun-
termeasures. In particular, extensive simulation- and testbed-
based experiments must be conducted in order to determine
optimal parameters for the instantiations of our countermea-
sures. Finally, we intend to assess how other content-centric
architectures fare with respect to DoS attacks.
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